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ABSTRACT 
This chapter examines the current state of digital artworks, arguing that they have not yet made a 
groundbreaking impact on the cultural landscape of the early 21st century and suggesting that a reason 
for this lack of notoriety is the obsolete model of agency deployed by many digital artists. 
 
As an alternative to what is framed as out-of-date forms of interactivity, the chapter highlights evolving 
research into interactive systems, artists' tools, applications, and techniques that will provide readers 
with an insightful and up-to-date examination of emerging multimedia technology trends. In particular, 
the chapter looks at situated computing and embodied systems, in which context-aware models of human 
subjects can be combined with sensor technology to expand the agencies at play in interactive works. The 
chapter connects these technologies to Big Data, Crowdsourcing and other techniques from artificial 
intelligence that expand our understanding of interaction and participation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The philosopher Alfred Whitehead wrote that “apart from the experiences of subjects there is, nothing, 
nothing, nothing, bare nothingness” (Whitehead, 1929, pp. 252-254). The present chapter will look at 
innovative interactive multimedia systems that integrate new conceptions of the subject into creative 
digital practice. Drawing on specific case studies and art historical framing the chapter will argue that 
digital artworks have not yet made a ground-breaking impact on the cultural landscape of the early 
twenty-first century, one main reason for this being the obsolete model of agency deployed by many 
artists who use computation as an artistic medium.  
 
This chapter presents the argument that a great number of the most current and high profile digital art 
works have not yet made a significant use of the core technological innovations that have occurred in the 
last 10 years, and that they are largely out of sync with advances in Computer Science and Web 
application development, in particular with the framing of subjects and agency.  
 
As an alternative to what is contextualised here as out-of-date forms of interactivity, it will highlight 
evolving research in interactive systems, artists’ tools, applications, and techniques that will provide 
readers with an insightful and up-to-date examination of emerging multimedia technology trends. More 
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precisely, it will look at situated computing and embodied systems, in which context-aware models of 
human subjects can be combined with sensor technology to expand the agencies at play in interactive 
works. The chapter will connect these technologies to Big Data, Crowdsourcing and other techniques 
from artificial intelligence that expand our understanding of interaction and participation. 
 
The case studies presented here will elucidate the specific technical and design strategies used in real 
world projects, clearly explaining the mathematical and conceptual processes and procedures at play. 
Basic code examples are provided, in order to allow readers to hack into and play with the concepts 
outlined. 
 
The first half of the chapter will look at the emergence of new media art and put it in historical and 
theoretical context. The second part of the chapter will present a typology of interaction modes and 
propose a radical vision for digital art, one that deploys a far more sophisticated notion of agency within 
the participant/creator dyad than the one currently used; it will look at the formation of temporally 
specific contextualised relationships between subjects and digital works. The final part of the chapter will 
suggest solutions by examining case studies, describing how a range of more recent artworks (including 
two by the co-author, Eleanor Dare) present multi-linear, situated and embodied forms of intra-activity as 
an alternative to more linear forms of interaction deployed by most contemporary, high profile, digital art 
works.  
 
 
SETTING THE STAGE  
The late 1960s and early 1970s signalled the arrival of a new era for exhibition practices as well as the 
birth of what was later to be called ‘media art’. It is appropriate to briefly examine the events of this 
period, since it laid the foundations for the inclusion of digital works as an acceptable art practice and 
various issues around display strategies (in relation to new media and technological innovation) that 
occupied curators, historians and critics at the time and which still prevail todayi.  
At the beginning of the decade (1960)1, the art critic Clement Greenberg wrote “Modernist Painting”. The 
essay came to typify the Modernist critical position on the visual arts and acted as an inspiration for the 
‘white cube’ as the ideal exhibition space. According to Greenberg, the “advanced” or “ambitious” Art 
was an art that could “test society's capacity for high art”; those called “purists”, who defended abstract 
art as the only defence against kitsch and the decline in culture, were also those who valued art the most.  
Modernism had to establish itself in the social arena, by demonstrating that the kind of experience it 
provided was valuable “in its own right and not to be obtained by any other kind of activity” (Greenberg, 
1992, p. 775)ii. The area of competence of each art would lie in the uniqueness of the nature of its medium. 
Thus, the shared elements between the artistic disciplines should be eliminated in order for each art to 
reach a culmination with the absolute purity of its particular form. Greenberg’s account of artistic 
standards - and particularly of the ways in which art’s separateness as a social practice is secured - called 
into question his hope that art could become a provider of value in its own right. The form of Modernism 
was that of an art “whose object is nothing but itself”, constantly discovering that “the self is pure as only 
pure negativity can be” and offering its audience the assertion that nothing tirelessly and “adequately 
made over into form” (Clark, 1985, p. 60). Greenberg believed that in High Modernism, the aesthetic 
experience of a painting can only be understood by other kind of experience in relation to other paintings; 
there was no point in looking to political or historical meanings because opticality alone guaranteed art.  
At the time, the formulation of ‘art for art’s sake’ found its ultimate champion in MoMA and its display 
tactics. Visitors were to engage in exercises in aesthetic contemplation by following a set path through 
gallery spaces with white walls and a sparse hang that transcended the pervasiveness of the outside world; 
nothing distracted from the encounter with the artwork. Numerous artists based their creations - and still 
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do - on this very premise: the whiteness of the walls, the vast space where their work could be shown. The 
above premise was, however, challenged by the arrival of screen-based works, where time was disrupted 
and the visitor no longer viewed but ‘watched’ art. The moving image functioned in the same way that the 
19th century heavy frame did: it isolated the surrounding scenery. A new dynamic of exhibits’ 
juxtaposition was created that gave birth to new challenges in curatorial choices of display. 
Around the same time, notably through the publication of Jack Burnham’s Beyond Modern Sculpture 
(1968) and Gene Youngblood’s Expanded Cinema (1970), the convergence of art, technology and 
cybernetics began to be critically evaluated. Youngblood’s account praised pioneering video, cinema and 
computer art practices, whereas Burnham’s analysis of modern and contemporary sculpture introduced 
the crucial distinction between sculpture as ‘object’ and sculpture as ‘system’. According to Burnham, an 
object “occupies a specific space: it has place, remaining inert and stationary” (Burnham, 1968, p. 12). A 
system, however, is  
 
[...] an aggregate of components; first, its parts are mutually dependent; and second, it may 
manifest some of the fundamental characteristics natural to life: self-organisation, growth, 
internal or external mobility, irritability or sensitivity, input and output, kinetically sustained 
equilibrium and eventual death. 
      (Burnham, 1968, p. 12) 
 
In this context, sculpture could prolong its survival through a “transition from the object to the system” 
(Burnham, 1968, p. 13). 
The distinction between Modernist art and the ‘theatricality’ of other forms of art practice was integrated 
intensely by Michael Fried’s “Art and Objecthood” (1967). Fried distinguished the opticality of a work of 
art from the experience of viewing it (which he called ‘theatricality’) in a text that attacked Minimalism. 
He was against art appreciation being conditioned by cultural, historical or sociological factors, which, as 
he claimed, prevented the work from being seen as an independent entity. Minimalist art, he stated, is a 
“largely ideological [...] enterprise” (Fried, 1967, p. 1). As a “new genre of theatre”, it became the 
negation of art (Fried, 1967, p. 3). Objecthood, in this light, is precicely this context of the “condition of 
non-art” (ibid.). Drawing on Greenberg, he traced a clear difference between “modernist painting’s self-
imposed imperative that it defeat or suspend its own obejcthood through the medium of shape” and the 
literalist “espousal” of objecthood as “an art in its own right” (Fried, 1967, p. 6). In “Art and Objecthood”, 
Fried defined clearly the differentiation between Modernist art and the arts that dealt mostly with space or 
time. In the case of screen-based works, both of the latter notions usually form a central part in their 
essence and presentation. If one opens up the argument even further, it could be suggested that 
contemporary art production “is a proposal to live in a shared world, giving rise to other relations, and so 
on and so forth, ad infinitum” (Bourriaud, 2002, p. 22). The aesthetic experience here is closer to the 
notion of social exchanges than artistic appreciation.  He found that this new genre, “inasmuch as it 
compelled a durational viewing experience akin to theatre, undermined both the medium specificity and 
the presumed instantaneousness of modernism” (Mondloch,  2010, p. 1). Cinema, on the other hand, was 
never in danger of theatricality, as the screen was not experienced as an object functioning in a specific 
physical relation to us (Fried, 1967).  
Kate Mondloch, in her extensive analysis on viewing media installation art, suggests that the divide 
suggested by Fried between Minimalism and the cinema gradually shrank with the expanded field of art 
and media practices in the 1960s and 1970s and the consequent overlapping of boundaries between the 
sculptural and the cinematic (Mondloch, 2010, p. 1). In 1965, with the release of the first portable video 
recorder, Portapak, by Sony, the video apparatus became an easy-to-use device for recording the moving 
image, one that started being used by artists as a means of artistic expression. In the same year, Andy 
Warhol showed his first recordings with a Norelco slant-track video recorder at a party in New York, and 
Nam June Paik presented his work Electronic Video Recorder in the New York Café Au Go Go, created 
using a Portapak. “Just as collage technic [sic] replaced oil paint, so the cathode ray tube will replace the 
canvas”, he wrote on the flyer that was distributed on the first public showing of the video, a sentence that 
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has come to be referenced innumerable times ever since (Marin & Grosevick, 2006, p. 10, see also Rush, 
1999, p. 82) iii. His footage of the Papal visit (allegedly shot from a cab whilst the Pope and his entourage 
made their way down 5th Avenue) is considered to be the birth of video art (Rush, 1999, Knight, 1996). 
In the same period, and contrary to the Modernist tradition and the praise of optical form alone, the 
Fluxus movement attempted to break down the barriers separating different forms of art and merge music, 
theatre, visuals arts and most importantly, the artists and their audience; art and life was seen as one 
inseparable mode of existence. In 1967, a video installation by Bruce Nauman entered the realm of the 
museum in American Sculptures of the Sixties in the Los Angeles County Museum of Art and the Howard 
Wise Gallery in New York presented TV as a Creative Medium. At the time, the use of the moving image 
by artists questioned the role of the arts in a technologically driven society, reacted against television and 
promoted a critical dialogue with conceptual art. Stan Vanderbeek exhibited with Robert Whitman and 
Dan Graham (The Projected Image, ICA Boston, 1967) and Les Levine with Hans Haacke, Douglas 
Huebler (Software, Information Technology: Its New Meaning for Art, Jewish Museum New York, 
1970)iv.  
In Electronic Culture: technology and visual representation (1996), Timothy Druckrey argues that there 
are “shifting means of reproducibility” to be noted, “particularly the emergence of the screen as the 
central point of the communicative and aesthetic experience” (Druckrey, 1996, p. 12). The edited volume 
gathers a series of examinations of forms of visualisation from diverse fields, in order to map the digital 
revolution that has been taking place since the late 20th century and to contextualise it whilst “reasoning 
with history” (Druckrey, 1996, p. 21). What is crucial here is the understanding that, even though 
electronic culture is a phenomenon to be explored, its re-definition of the very concept of representation is 
largely due to its historical context.   
The two trajectories regarding modernist narratives and “machine art” and towards “systems and 
information technology” (Sutton, 2004, p. 2) that emerged in the late 1960s, still prevail today. Lev 
Manovich, commenting on “the art establishment’s lack of engagement with new technology” attributes 
the situation to the “division between ‘Turing land’ (inhabited by the computer arts) and ‘Duchamp land’ 
(inhabited by postmodern conceptual art)” (Muller, Edmonds & Connell, 2006, p. 3). Edward A. Shanken 
suggests that there is a hybrid discourse between mainstream art and new media, since their paths have 
become increasingly divergent (Shanken, 2011, p. 1). Mainstream art employs the vocabulary of digital 
culture (such as ‘interactivity’, ‘participation’, ‘programming’, and ‘networks’), and which we will 
examine later in the chapter, while dismissing new media art due to its form or immateriality. In 
“Exhibiting New Media Art”, Gloria Sutton suggests that “the practical and theoretical issues of 
exhibiting new media art within a traditional museum context” discussed at present employ a “critical 
syntax […that] echoes the conversations of the late 1960s and 1970s” (Sutton, 2004, p. 1); indeed, since 
moving away from the static object to accommodating a broader range of practices that fall into the 
category of the ‘dynamic arts’, judgements of quality have yet to find a way to correspond to the situation. 
In contemporary art criticism, “political, moral and ethical judgements have come to fill the vacuum of 
aesthetic judgement in a way that was unthinkable forty years ago” (Bishop, 2004, p. 77). Bishop traces 
this situation back to Postmodernism which “attacked the very notion of aesthetic judgement” and to 
contemporary art’s “solicit[ing] the viewer’s literal interaction in ever more elaborate ways” (Bishop, 
2004, pp. 77-78).  
Shanken argues that even though both mainstream and new media art can learn from the other, the latter 
deserves a more prominent position in contemporary art history (Shanken 2011, p. 7). In addition, he has 
analysed Jack Burnham’s early writings (for example “The House that Jack built”), to reposition the 
former.  He does note, however, that in the same way that photography was shunned and then endorsed 
by the mainstream art market (with auction highs of 3,3 million dollars in the period 1994-2008) video 
reached a 700,000 dollars peak for a Bill Viola (whose piece The Stopping Mind [1990] is examined later 
in the chapter) work in 2000 (Shanken 2011, pp. 15-16). In this light, and while keeping in mind that the 
auction prime is still reserved for painted canvases, if the post-medium condition really prevailed, “the 
exclusionary prejudice against the use of technological media in and as art would not exist” (Shanken 
2011, p. 18). However, curators, critics and historians do make the distinction between media and the 
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direct or indirect use of technology. In this arena, the “lofty, theoretical ideal” is usually elevated at the 
expense of the “quotidian, practical tool” (Shanken, 2011, p. 18).  
 
Digital art and viewing regimes  
In 1972, the Tate Gallery acquired Carl Andre’s Equivalent VIII. A sculpture made of 120 bricks placed 
in a rectangular formation, it became a major representative of Minimalist work. Four years later, The 
Times published an article on the Tate’s recent acquisitions  that featured a picture of the work. When the 
latter was put back on display in 1976, The Daily Mirror exclaimed on its front page: “What a Load of 
Rubbish”. Archival material from that time shows the public moving around the work and commenting 
upon the fact that it is indeed a pile of bricksv. The anecdote serves to exemplify Fried’s conceptualisation 
of Minimalist art as occupying space rather than focusing on opticality alone, but also to demonstrate the 
changing viewing regimes of the public over the years.  
In the context of digital and interactive art, the more we operate with screen technologies, the more our 
behaviour around them evolves and changes. This would perhaps be stating the obvious, but the public 
witnessing of Nam June Paik’s sculptural screen installations during the first years of video art would not 
have generated the same reaction as the public visiting an exhibition dedicated to early video art today, 
having already been exposed to a plethora of screen media on a daily basis.  
In this framework, it is often suggested that, with the current impact of new media technologies on art 
production, curators have reached a point where they create content instead of a context (Cook, 2003). In 
order to examine the complexities of curating new media artworks, it is crucial to overview the activities 
that precede their exhibition. These are: 
• The curatorial judgements of quality in order to select and classify new media works  
• The creation of a “context” for the work 
• The placement of the work in a given space/environment 
 
Curatorial judgements of quality 
In theories concerning judgements of quality for a work of art (as, for example, in Kant, 1978, Hegel, 
1993, Bourdieu, 1979, Greenberg, 1993, Benjamin, 2002, Buck-Morss, 1989) the object of study was to 
be found in stable and static forms. Moreover, the work of art was considered to be something already 
made and present for contemplation. There is indeed an awkward, uneasy approach when the 
communicative character, the mediality and the duration of a work of art come into play. However, the 
curators of a mixed-media museum focus less on art production and more on art’s reception; thus, they 
“engag[e] in research in order to issue judgements of quality” (Cook, 2003, p. 170). 
 In “Toward a Theory of the Practice of Curating New Media Art”2, Sarah Cook examines the “curatorial 
role of creating context” (Cook, 2003, p. 169) via the examination of theories about curating and the 
description of the aesthetic characteristics of new media art that challenge that traditional framework.  
In this context, a work of art is seen as either a definitive expression by an artist (in which case the 
methodology used is a reference to his/her biography or to the current context) or a blank screen onto 
which can be projected any number of art historical interpretations (in which case the work of art needs to 
be placed either within a specialised body of knowledge around it or within a historical trajectory) (Cook, 
2003, p. 171). Even though the 1960s gave birth to an artistic expression that favoured experience to 
interpretation, the methodologies based on aesthetic theory evolve around the static object, thus limiting 
and giving a ‘closed reading’ of a dynamic work of art. When experiencing a constantly mediated reality, 
these theories might appear obsolete and out of context. In this light, if one placed Leonardo Da Vinci's 
Mona Lisa (circa 1503 – 1506) in the Louvre, on an easel in an artist's studio or hung it in their garage, it 
could be suggested that the work of art by itself would have remained unaltered in its essence. However, 
Nam June Paik's multi-screen installations or Tony Oursler's screen-assisted sculptures (to mention two 
representative examples illustrating this point) become very different works when the exhibiting 
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conditions change (lighting, space, movement of the visitors in space), thus they are experienced in a 
varied way from one location to another. The aesthetics of projects that present a screen as - or within - 
their end product can be variable, interactive and experimental. In some cases, the viewers might just 
watch; in some others they might have to touch buttons, interact, speak, move. This immersion within the 
work excludes them from the disinterested position of the viewer/judge and puts them in a position of co-
co-authoring the work. Also, even in ‘old’ media art - and taking as a hypothesis that most visitors do not 
watch all moving image works from beginning to end -, one visitor does not see the same ‘version’ as the 
other. When time is concerned, the “discursive becomes spatial and the visual becomes discursive” 
(Rodowick, 2001, p. 39, quoted in Cook,  2003, p. 173).  
A great number of screen-based works cannot be seen as self-contained unities: they might refer to other 
cultural products, ask for the visitor’s participation, integrate performances or collaborate with other 
networks to mention but a few. In this respect, the curators can no longer distance themselves from the 
work, basing their judgement on its static representation. In order to create a context for the work and 
subsequently issue judgements, the curators have to research the contexts/environments that the work 
refers to (for example performance and the software industry or public art and open source coding) in 
order to form a discourse around it. In the dynamic arts, there is a third dimension (or ‘third space’, 
according to Cook [2003]) that needs to be investigated and it is precisely through the knowledge of this 
dimension that judgements of quality can be accurately made.   
 
Context or content? 
We have seen that one of the main roles of the curator of contemporary art is to create a context for the 
work to be exhibited. Also, with the deprofessionalisation of the curator and the abundance of curating 
courses teaching the practical aspects of the role rather than art history or museology, the curator has 
come to be responsible for the process that leads to an exhibition and not for the knowledge surrounding 
the exhibits themselvesvi.  
An important part of this process is the understanding of peripheral requirements - usually of a technical 
nature - for the presentation of a work. The curators need to be aware of the medium that the artists use as 
much as they need to know about the work itself; they need to know how the technology of the work 
behaves and what this means for the work in question. The rule applies equally to works that employ new 
technology (such as a 360-degree stereoscopic immersive interactive visualisation system, installed at 
ZKM) or dated media (such as a video tape with its limited life span)vii. As Christiane Paul has argued, 
“the history of technology and media sciences plays an equally important role [as art history] in this art’s 
formation and reception”, continuing that “new media art requires media literacy” (Paul, 2008, p. 5).  
In this context, however, is there not a danger for curators to “get caught up in only [sic] the work’s 
medium and not the wider context for the technology as it is used in the artwork?” (Cook, 2003, p. 175). 
If this indeed happens, will it not it be explicit in the presentation of the work? Especially in exhibitions 
where screens constitute the main medium of presentation, it is easy for the audience to be directed in 
examining the screen itself and its inherent meaning rather than the meaning/content of the actual work. It 
is interesting to examine how exhibitions of this kind handle the above difficulty and how they get across 
to their visitors (see for example, Software: Information Technology – Its New Meaning for Art, Jewish 
Museum New York [1970], Spellbound, Hayward Gallery London [1996], Art and Money Online, Tate 
Britain London [2001], Videographies – The Early Decades, The Factory - Hellenic National Museum of 
Contemporary Art [2005], China Power Station: Part I, Battersea Power Station London - Serpentine 
Gallery, Red Mansion Foundation & Astrup Fearnley Museum of Modern Art [2006]). 
As the curator has gradually moved from a strict museology environment to a more process-based 
practice that focuses chiefly on “temporary exhibitions” and “the specific context of their audiences” 
(Cook, 2008, p. 29, Greenberg, Ferguson & Nairne, 1996), it is suggested that the context itself 
sometimes becomes the content (O'Doherty, 1999, pp. 65-86). In the foreword of Rethinking Curating 
(2010), Steve Dietz remembers that around the time he had founded the new media art program at the 
Walker Art Center (1996), the then Museum Director commented that she did not find net art visually 
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compelling. The example serves for Dietz to illustrate that new media art is not merely about viewing but 
also about processes, interactivity and networks (Graham & Cook, 2010, p. xiii).   
It then becomes imperative to start thinking in terms of behaviours when the inclusion of screens and 
interaction are concerned rather than of a specific medium and the way in which this operates. Dietz 
suggests that the above concept, formulated by Graham and Cook when asked to define the term ‘new 
media’, could be useful in order to understand much of contemporary art. He pursues the argument 
historically, arguing that photography was the ‘new medium’ that introduced a new way of looking at 
suspended time, one which challenged the aesthetic understanding of painting, thereby video in turn 
challenged the aesthetic understanding of film whilst, with television, they were the ‘new media’ that 
introduced the idea of real time and, finally, new mediaviii challenged the understanding of the behaviour 
of contemporary art by including in the art equation the elements of interactivity and participation. The 
conclusion of his positioning is that “art is different after new media because of new media” and this 
change takes place “not because new media is ‘next’, but because its behaviours are the behaviours of our 
technological times” (Graham & Cook, 2010, p. xiv). In short, one could suggest that new media art, and 
by extension all types of screen-based works, present characteristics that distinguish it from static art and 
thus create new types of environments where they can be exhibited.  As such, the technology used 
constitutes a context around which the work is developed and serves as a vehicle for the communication 
of an idea; it is not to constitute the content of the work or to comment about questions surrounding 
technology.  
 
 
INTERACTION AND AGENCY IN DIGITAL ARTWORKS 
The first half of this chapter looked at the historical and theoretical context of digital artworks, exposing a 
complex range of conceptual and aesthetic traditions that impact upon our understanding, presentation 
and reception of digital pieces. This part of the chapter will now look at alternative philosophical 
approaches to digital artworks and examine a range of technical processes that might alter the conceptual 
focus of such works, presenting a more contemporary framing of digital technology and its relationship to 
art in the 21st century. A typology of interaction types will also be presented so that readers might better 
understand the technical characteristics of common interaction forms encountered in digital art. This 
section will look in detail at alternative interaction modes and the specific ways in which they have been 
used by artists.  When seeking to define interactivity, it is necessary to also define its inter-dependent 
elements such as agency, subjectivity and embodiment. 
 
 
CORE FRAMES OF REFERENCE 
In order to support a detailed examination of the types of interaction typically deployed by digital 
artworks it is helpful to clarify some core terms and outline the frames of reference used, starting with the 
digital computer itself. While the following  explanations may appear to be rudimentary, it is important to 
recognise that these are for example, binary systems that do not use zeros and ones, as well as historical 
computers that are not digital, for example analogue computers such as slide rules and human computers. 
There are also distributed systems that do not deploy a CPU. What is referred to here comprises the 
current mainstream of computing hardware and computing systems. 
 
A digital computer typically consists of four (sometimes described as 3) parts as follows: 
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Table 1. Four-part structure of a Von Neumann computer model 
 
Input-Output devices: such as keyboards and screens 
 
Main Memory: stores data, such as programs. 
 
ALU: an Arithmetic-Logic Unit performs mathematical-logical operations. 
 
CU: a Control Unit communicates and directs operations performed by the ALU. 
 
The Control Unit: (CU) and the Arithmetic-Logic Unit (ALU) together comprise the Central 
Processing Unit or CPU. Multi-processor computers have more than one CPU. The Control Unit in a 
digital computer communicates between the memory and the ALU, and directs operations performed by 
the ALU.  
 
The ALU performs logical and mathematical operations on binary data and typically, though not 
exclusively, on 0s and 1s.  
 
 
This four-part architecture is based on the Von Neumann model of computing in which the computer 
memory stores programs and data. The control unit gets its instructions from the memory and the 
processing unit performs mathematical operations. Then, the control unit fetches further instructions from 
the memory. In this system everything is reduced to a binary representation in which there are only two 
possibilities: either an electrical signal represented by a 1, or no signal represented by a 0.  
 
This is therefore, first and foremost, a system of symbolic representation. There is no “direct experience”, 
no “intuition” and certainly no possibility for non-mathematical engagement with any of the input such a 
system receives. This point is emphasised now because the later part of this chapter will explore how the 
body, including its non-symbolic experiences, might be represented within a typical Von Neumann model 
and its wider systems. 
 
It is important to understand that there is a difference between a computer – the aforementioned four-part 
entity, and a computer system. A computer system draws in a far wider set of actors and concepts, which 
we will now aim to define. These include interaction, agents and agency, subjects, situations and 
embodiment. 
 
Defining interactivity and interaction 
Interaction is defined by Noble as “the exchange of information between two or more active participants” 
(Noble, 2012, p. 3) but, unless the concept of an active participant is defined, how far does this definition 
help to clarify the meaning of interaction? Noble arguably acknowledges this complexity by then pointing 
out a further complicating concept, that of the feedback loop: 
 
The feedback loop is a process of an entity communicating with itself while checking 
with either an internal or external regulatory system (2012, p.3). 
The notion of the feedback loop is a reminder that when considering interactivity it is also necessary to 
identify the origins, form and flow of logic that is applied to user input, whether this is linear or non-
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linear, pre-determined or random, non-determined but not random, human, adaptive or some other form 
of machine-learning operation. These terms are outlined in the table below: 
 
 
 
Table 2. Clarification of terms such as “Linear” and “Pre-determination” 
 
Linear: might also be called “uni-linear”. It implies sequential operations and a one-way flow of agency. 
In contrast, the term “non-linear” implies branching possibilities and choices. 
 
Multi-linear: describes many possible choices and directions of agency. The term “multi-linear” might, 
as Aarseth implies, represent a challenge to the polarity of linear/non-linear agencies (Aarseth, 1997, 
p.44) 
 
Pre-determination: implies an a priori, fixed system. The operations of such a system are known 
beforehand. 
 
Random: the specific outcome is not known by the system, but the system is not learning or adapting. 
For instance, in  the case of throwing a virtual dice.  
 
Non-determined but not random:  implies an adaptive system that may use machine learning, genetic 
algorithms or some other intelligent operation to change its behaviour as it sees fit. The outcome will not 
be wholly known by the designer/programmer but will, instead, emerge. It may imply a high degree of 
autonomy within the system. 
 
 
Interactivity is further defined by Downes and McMillan (2000) as operating within six formal 
dimensions:  
 
• Direction of communication 
• Time flexibility 
• Sense of place 
• Level of control 
• Responsiveness  
• Perceived purpose of communication 
              (Downes & McMillan, 2000, pp. 157-179) 
 
Downes et al recognise that many definitions of interactivity are contradictory and sometimes 
meaningless, a point that has also been made by Manovich (2001) among others. There is however, 
unanimous agreement that, regardless of the mode of interaction, software is a representational medium, 
but the representational nature of digital computers should not inhibit the conceptual and practical 
evolution of interaction modes. Dourish (2001) implores us to conceive of: 
 
a more nuanced understanding of the role that those representations play, how they 
are subject to a variety of interpretations and actions, and how they figure as part of 
a larger body of practice. The opportunity is to break the link between an inevitably 
representationalist stance toward software and a much more questionable stance 
toward action and interaction (Dourish, 2001, p. 208).  
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Others, such as Trifonova (2008) have also elucidated useful framings of the interactive, but, when 
attempting to grasp precisely these more nuanced understandings that Dourish and others encourage, it is 
useful to go back to the key term Noble (2012) used in defining interaction – ‘active participants’. What is 
meant by the concept of an ‘active participant’ and how does this help in extending interactivity? 
 
 
 
Agents and agency 
Within intelligent software systems, an active participant is an ‘agent’ and the power an agent wields is 
called 'agency'. A human agent makes things happen in the world. A software agent is similarly able, 
within its own world, to effect changes. Agency therefore influences events and processes while acting 
within a wider environment; however, it is important to dispense with the notion that agency is a ‘thing’ 
or a linear force, or that it is restricted solely to human agents. 
 
In their classic text on artificial intelligence Russell and Norvig assert that an agent “is just something that 
acts” (Russell & Norvig, 2002, p. 4), but they also point out that: 
 
Computer agents are expected to have other attributes that distinguish them from 
mere ‘programs’, such as operating under autonomous control, perceiving their 
environment, persisting over a prolonged time period, adapting to change, and being 
capable of taking on another’s goals. A rational agent is one that acts so as to 
achieve the best outcome or, when there is uncertainty, the best expected outcome 
(Russell and Norvig, 2002, p. 4). 
Despite this clear-cut description, the conceptual boundaries of agency itself are not so obvious. A 
significant number of theorists, including Barad (2007), Slack and Wise (2005), Adam (1998), Hayles 
(1999), Suchman, (2007) and Haraway (1991), agree that the meaning of agency is neither neutral nor 
implicit. Slack and Wise are at pains to distinguish agency from causality, which they characterise as 
being restricted and one-dimensional: 
 
The causal approach has a certain universal undertone to it, meaning that its 
purported causal effects are assumed to be the same under any-and–every-
circumstance. The causal approach cannot adequately grasp the particularities of 
situations (Slack & Wise, 2005, p. 116). 
Instead of considering agency as a possession or a thing, agency can be seen as a process and a form of 
relationship, one that “does not require human intention, which means that technologies can be involved 
in relations of agency” (Slack et al, 2005, p. 117). In considering software agents, Maes (1997) has stated 
that the term implies non-passive, proactive, personal helpers. Her description of agent technology evokes 
a high level, idealised scenario of personalised and proactive helper software agents, while Wooldridge’s 
(2002) requirements for an intelligent agent are precisely that ‘he’ or ‘it’ should be as follows: 
 
• Situated – 'he' is embedded in an environment. 
• Goal directed – ‘he’ has goals that ‘he’ tries to achieve. 
• Reactive – ‘he’ reacts to changes in ‘his’ environment. 
• Social – ‘he’ can communicate with other agents (including humans). 
  (Wooldridge, 2002, p. 23). 
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Multi-agent systems are built from networks of agents that can act autonomously, often across distributed 
environments. Multi-agent systems can solve problems that are too complex for individual agents, human 
or otherwise, to solve.  Agents in such systems do not require a global view of any system,  in fact they 
are more likely to have only a ‘local view’. A common analogy is to members of a swarm, such as ants or 
bees; the individual entities of swarms are decentralised, with no single controlling agent. Such agents are 
often embedded or situated in an environment, making them context-aware via sensors or other types of 
input. 
  
But what exactly do these terms, particularly ‘situated’ and ‘embedded’ imply? The next section will 
examine the significance of context-aware, ‘situated’ software agents. 
 
 
Situated cognition  
In the context of artificial intelligence, situated agents are embedded in an environment. In Haraway’s 
terms (1988), situatedness also constitutes an ethical recognition of the partiality and locatedness of 
knowledge, as opposed to an idealised notion of objective and placeless universality. The anthropologist 
Lucy Suchman (1987, 2007) presents the case for a radical re-framing of computer-human interaction; her 
interaction model is defined by the degree of pre-existent representation needed for computer systems to 
work satisfactorily. Suchman proposes a new conception of interactivity in which contingent plans work 
in tandem with situated, context-aware programs; in other words, programs that operate within physical 
environments. 
 
Embedded in the notion of situatedness is a clear challenge to the conventional idea of a subject, or what 
Suchman identifies as the “unitary cogniser” (Suchman, 2007), also known as the ‘Cartesian cogito’, 
named after the 17th century philosopher René Descartes. The Cartesian cogito is a rational thinker, in 
classically cognitivist terms his thought processes are almost inseparable from those of a computer; his 
disembodied models of interaction are characterised by information-processing paradigms, in which 
symbolic representations are rationally evaluated. These paradigms are predicated on notions of 
environmental stimulus and behavioural response: 
 
The first premise of cognitive science, therefore, is that people (or ‘cognizers’ of any 
sort) act on the basis of symbolic representations: a kind of cognitive code, 
instantiated physically in the brain, on which operations are performed to produce 
mental states such as ‘the belief that p’, which in turn produce behaviour consistent 
with those states (Suchman, 2007, p. 37). 
The classical emphasis on symbolic representation is significant here, since it posits a mind-body split in 
which the body has minimal agency. The alternative model is one in which the body is a significantly 
active agent. The emphasis on embodiment in interaction and cognitive science has been advanced by the 
writings of Maturana and Varela (1987), Thompson and Rosch (1991), and more recently by Gallagher 
(2005), Damasio (2005), Alva Noë (2004) and Kiverstein (2010), among many others.  In order to look at 
the significance of embodiment for digital interaction in detail, it is appropriate to explore the idea that all 
human experience is both situated and embodied, a principle that can also be referred to as ‘enactivism’. 
 
Embodiment and Enactivism 
In contrast to the mind-body split of the rational cogito as a model for how humans operate within the 
world, an enactivist approach is a theory of cognition that is inseparable from action and is therefore 
implicitly embodied. Varela et al proposed the radical notion that experience, knowledge and cognition 
always emanate from both the body and the mind: 
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knower and known, mind and world, stand in relation to each other through mutual 
specification or dependent coorigination (Varela et al., 1991, p. 150). 
It is important to also note their emphasis on the situatedness of human actions, that they take place 
within a non-symbolic, physical world. This, as Dennett explains, is a radical move away from pre-given 
notions of “internal” and “external” realms, of separate subjects operating on separate objects: 
 
Cognitive scientists standardly assume a division between independently existing 
(‘pregiven’) ‘external’ objects, properties and events on the one hand and their 
‘internal’ representations in symbolic media in the mind/brain on the other. Varela 
et al. propose to replace this with an ‘enactive’ account (Dennett, 1993, p. 121). 
The idea that there is an emergent world of separate subjects and objects, rather than an implicit, a priori 
set of independent entities, has also been proposed by the physicist Karen Barad (2007), who deploys the 
term ‘intra-action’ as an alternative to interaction. In Barad's terms, intra-action does not presuppose “the 
prior existence of independent entities of relata” (Barad, 2007, p. 139). It does not take for granted 
atomistic or Cartesian separations between subject and object, instead Barad sees specific situations and 
actions as allowing phenomenological relata to emerge as specific causal intra-actions. This, in tandem 
with enactivism, is a very radical alternative to the types of interaction modelled on the classical 
cognitivist hypothesis. 
 
Barad's challenge is to question the power placed in symbolic representation as tantamount to reality, as 
the main agent in human knowing and experiencing of the world. Barad calls her intra-active approach 
“agential realism” (Barad, 2007), in which knowing and knowledge generation are rooted in actions and 
relationships. The case studies presented towards the end of the chapter will look at how these ideas might 
work in practice, exploring a range of artworks that have deployed radical alternatives to conventional 
interaction modes, which, as the next section will evidence, are often characterised by pre-determined 
systems and pre-given distinctions between subjects and objects. The next section will therefore move 
away from the high-level, theoretical discussion of interactivity to the specific examination of twenty-five 
high-profile digital artworks. It will also outline the types of input and logic such works deploy and look 
at alternative approaches. 
 
 
A TYPOLOGY OF INTERACTION MODES 
A typology involves the analysis and classification of types. Constructing a typology aids researchers in 
identifying clusters, such as grouped patterns of behaviour, formal properties or attitudes.  In the typology 
constructed for this chapter, a range of interaction types have been examined, while their use (or non use) 
by a number of high profile digital artworks has also been assessed. A Multiple Correspondence Analysis 
(MCA) of the typology then enabled the exploration of a range of interactive artworks and their formal 
interactive and logical structures. The MCA was performed in order to identify patterns and correlations 
embedded in the data. This process was triangulated by a cluster analysis, providing further evidence for 
the presence of identifiable classes of artwork.  
 
Before undertaking the typology, a range of input types were identified, which were then condensed into 
eight identifiable modes and arranged within a contingency table (a table of data relating to two or more 
categorical variables). The analysis was undertaken with the statistical and machine learning language 
“R”. The types of input identified as well as the process and its outcomes are now described. 
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Input Devices 
The types of input devices used by digital systems help us to identify the forms of agency used by 
external actors within an interaction process. Contemporary digital computer systems use input devices 
such as keyboards, mice, touch screens, microphones, and various sensors to acquire the data they will 
operate upon. They might also acquire data through networks. There are also, of course, many output 
devices used by contemporary computer systems, for example screens, audio speakers, printers and 
physical actuators such as motors and pistons.  
 
The simplest definition of an input device is a mechanism that sends data to a computer; the data may 
take the form of mouse movements, keys on a keyboard being pressed, mouse clicks, and also 
combinations of inputs, such as a click and a keyboard press, for example the common “ctrl+click” 
combination.  
 
The typology presented here, though not exhaustive (new input devices will almost certainly be invented 
at the time of writing), represents all of the most commonly found input devices as well as some very 
specialist forms of input mechanism, such as medical imaging and head tilt sensors for severely disabled 
computer users.  
 
Table 3. Table of input devices 
Mouse 
Keyboard/virtual or physical 
Joysticks 
Microphone 
Microphone and speech recognition systems 
Yokes: such as an aircraft simulation pulling or pushing device 
Composite game controller: with combinations of buttons and accelerometers, steering wheels, paddle 
etc. 
Touch screen 
Graphics tablet/stylus 
Midi keyboard/drum and other midi input devices 
Digital cameras, Webcams, other visual input 
Buttons, switches, potentiometers 
Remote control 
 
Breath detection 
Head movement detector 
Eye tracker 
Nouse (detects breath from nose) 
Body sensor: such as heart rate, EEG, galvanic skin response, breath etc. 
Biometrics: such as finger print and iris scanners 
Other medical sensing/imaging technology                           
Motion and proximity sensors: including the Kinect sensor 
 
Environmental sensors: these detect environmental data such as temperature, pollution, light levels 
 
Scanners 
Barcode readers 
 
Card readers 
Magnetic-Ink Character Recognition (MICR) 
14 
 
Optical Mark Reader (OMR) 
Punched card input 
 
Light pens 
Handwriting recognition 
  
CAVEs: computer-assisted virtual environments 
VR helmet and gloves 
3D Gloves 
Haptic Gloves 
 
 
Electronic Whiteboard: this has been counted as a type of Standard screen input, albeit often 
collaborative 
 
 
Networked: input might come automatically via WIFI 
 
 
These devices may be subdivided into the following categories: 
 
Table 4. Categories of input device 
Standard: keyboard, mouse, joystick, touch-screen, microphone, Webcam, remote control, whiteboard 
light pen 
 
MIDI devices 
 
Environmental sensors: temperature, pollution and light sensors etc.  
 
Internal Embodied: sensing internal bodily attributes such as heart rate, brain waves, breath 
  
Biometric: also embodied but usually engaged with surface features, for example iris, finger print and 
facial patterns. 
 
Embodied: close to the concept of “natural” interactions used by NUIs or “Natural User Interfaces”, 
such as stroking, picking up objects, walking, gesturing, speaking etc. CAVES may also be included in 
this category, includes handwriting recognition systems. 
 
Readers: card readers, bar code scanners, punched card input, OMR. 
 
 
It should be noted here that Preece et al wisely question the term ‘natural’ embedded within the acronym 
'NUI' (Natural User Interfaces) and ask whether learning a particular gesture to open a file in a NUI is any 
more natural than using a menu-based GUI for the same job (Preece et al, 2011, p. 215).   
Some devices cross categories, such as sound input, which could be classified as embodied as well as 
environmental, or even as a ‘standard’ form of computer input. It is important to acknowledge that the 
construction of a typology is an approximate and in many ways subjective process; another set of 
researchers might very well come up with a different set of results; this is a point that Aarseth (1997) 
made very clear when constructing his innovative typology of interactive texts.  
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When considering interactivity in artworks, the logic that is applied to user input was also identified, 
whether it was random, pre-determined, non-determined but not random (such as machine learning) 
human, adaptive or some other form of learning system. 
 
 
 
Table 5. Artists and artworks included in the typology 
       Artist                                       Artwork 
1. Grey World                    The Source 
2. Julian Opie                     Bruce Walking 
3. Golan Levin                      Eyecode 
4. Mark Napier     Shredder 
5. Corey Arcangel & Michael Frumin Pizza Party 
6. Bill Viola     The Stopping Mind 
7. Camille Utterback   Shifting Times 
8. Lozano-Hemmer   Under Scan 
9. Nam June Paik     Jacobs Ladder 
10. Stelarc      Parasite 
11. Jeffrey Shaw    Legible City 
12. William Latham   Mutator C 
13. Laurie Anderson    The Waters Reglitterized 
14. James Faure-Walker    Dark Filament 
15. Marius Watz     Arcs (Rockheim) 
16. Harold Cohen     Aaron 
17. Josh On     They Rule 
18. Blast Theory     My Neck of The woods 
19. Casey Reas    TI 
20. Miguel Chevalier    Sur-Natures 
21. Karsten Schmidt    Unstable Energy 
22. Daniel Rozin    Weave Mirror 
23. Troika     Digital Zoetrope 
24. Frost & Koblin    House of Cards 
25. John Maeda    Nature 
 
 
A Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA) is a statistical technique that enables the identification of 
patterns in more than two categorical variables; in this case, seventeen interaction and logic forms and 
twenty-five artworks. The MCA examined relative frequencies in terms of the mathematical distances 
between individual rows and columns. The topic of distance metrics will be returned to when the chapter 
looks at a working example of an “interest matching” or collaborative filtering algorithm. The resulting 
data evidences statistically significant variations which are then interpreted “as representing a distinct 
pattern of usage” (Glynn, 2012, p. 134).  
 
Each artwork was evaluated as TRUE or FALSE for the following variables: 
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Table 6. Variables applied to the typology of artworks 
             Not interactive  
Standard  
Midi  
Environment  
Internal-embodied  
Biometric  
Embodied  
Reader 
Network  
Linear  
Multi-linear  
Non-linear  
Determined  
Random  
Non-determined  
Adaptive  
Context-aware 
 
 
The two-dimensional Euclidean cloud of data that resulted enabled the identification of non-random, 
systematic correlations between variables, graphically represented in the chart below: 
 
Table 7. Artworks represented in two-dimensional space according to patterns of interaction and logic 
detected by the Multiple Correspondence Analysis 
 
TABLE 7 
 
Table 8. Modes of interaction and logic represented in two-dimensional space according to patterns of 
interaction and logic detected by the Multiple Correspondence Analysis 
 
TABLE 8 
 
The data space represented 25×17×2 or 850 variable positions and 850! (factorial) possible combinations, 
from which five loose and two major classes of digital artwork emerged. These were also confirmed by 
the hierarchical cluster dendrogram generated by a cluster analysis in R. The graphical representation of 
that cluster analysis is illustrated below. The dendrogram arranges clusters hierarchically, indicating 
which types of data they contain and their sub-groups. In this example the values were binary. 
 
Table 9. Dendrogram and heat map of clusters, or patterns of interactivity and logic in twenty-five digital 
artworks 
 
 
TABLE 9 
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Table 10. Eigenvalues and variances obtained from the Multiple Correspondence Analysis 
 number    eigenvalue        percentage of variance     cumulative percentage of variance 
  
1.  0.42332127              16.017561                         16.01756 
2.  0.22942201               8.680833                          24.69839 
3.  0.20643118               7.810909                          32.50930 
4.  0.15796309               5.976982                          38.48629 
5.  0.14013277               5.302321                          43.78861 
 
 
Eigenvalues represent the distinctness of the patterns identified by the MCA analysis. The major patterns 
of artwork interaction and logic types were identified as follows: 
 
Table 11. The five patterns of interaction and logic types identified by the typology (provided by the MCA 
analysis) 
Pattern 1: 
Arcs 
Mutator C 
Ti 
They Rule 
 
Pattern 2: 
House of Cards 
Pizza Party 
Shredder 
 
Pattern 3: 
The Source 
Parasite 
Sur-Natures 
Eyecode 
Shifting Times 
Legible City, (overlaps with 4) 
Weave Mirror 
Under Scan 
 
Pattern 4: 
Legible City 
The Stopping Mind 
My Neck of The Woods 
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Pattern 5: 
Jacob's Ladder 
Bruce Walking 
Nature 
The Waters Reglitterized 
Aaron 
Dark Filament 
Unstable Energy 
 
 
 
The patterns were characterised by the following qualities: 
 
Table 12. Attributes of the five patterns of interaction and logic 
Pattern 1: 
Networked 
Adaptive 
Non-Determined 
 
Pattern 2:  
Standard 
Networked 
 
Pattern 3: 
Aware of environment 
Non-determined 
Random 
Embodied 
Context-aware 
Internal embodied 
  
Pattern 4: 
Multi-linear 
Non-linear 
 
Pattern 5: 
Not context-aware 
Linear 
Determined 
Non-networked 
Disembodied 
 
 
 
The group defined by Pattern 5 represented a very dense cluster of deterministic, disembodied works, 
while Pattern 3 arguably represents the avant-garde of digital artworks, with notable outliers such as 
Stelarc's Parasite. However, as Pattern 3 was a less densely defined cluster, it was spread across a number 
of variables and included artworks with some, but not all, aspects of the more contemporary interaction 
models outlined in this chapter. 
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The typology of interaction modes and MCA demonstrates that, despite the growing withdrawal from the 
classical cognitivist approach to human-computer interaction, many major digital artworks are still 
embedded with the literal construal of the classical cognitivist hypothesis (Varela et al, 1991, p. 43). 
Interaction researchers such as Dourish (2001), among others, have encouraged a move away from linear, 
disembodied models of interaction and agency, but, perhaps surprisingly, this is still the dominant model 
of interaction for many digital artworks. If, as Dourish states, embodiment is “the property of our 
engagement with the world that allows us to make it meaningful” (Dourish, 2001, p. 126) then it is 
important to ask how digital artworks can expect to innovate and develop in the future, while operating 
within an outmoded paradigm. 
 
It is also important to point out that embedded action and engagement with the world does not imply 
gesture or movement alone; there are, as Dourish states, other types of embedded action, such as social 
action, “firmly rooted in the setting in which it arises, where that setting is not just material circumstances, 
but social, cultural, and historical ones as well” (Dourish, 2001, p. 96). And yet many of the works looked 
at here appear to operate within a cultural, social and physical vacuum. It is thus safe to conclude that 
digital artworks have not caught up with major paradigm shifts in computer science.  
 
The domain of computer science has arguably recovered from the failure of many AI projects of the 
1980s and early 1990s, in particular the grand and unimaginably expensive folly of 5th generation 
computing that resulted in the ‘AI winter’ (in which vast, rule-based systems were abandoned and 
funding for AI projects was widely curtailed). Cognitive computing, robotics and machine learning are 
areas that now pursue more mature notions of agency and intelligence. Contemporary approaches to 
intelligent systems have, on the whole, less grandiloquent goals than exactly modelling human 
intelligence or building a ‘brain in a vat’. They are often connected to data mining and pattern recognition 
tasks as well as industrial/military robotics with predominantly pragmatic goals, other researchers, such as 
Deliyannis (2013) focus on new, intelligent, methodologies for sustainability in multi-media applications. 
 
Torrance and Forese (2011) have identified a revived interest in many areas of artificial intelligence and 
interaction inspired by an enactivist approach, including adaptivity and autonomy, enactive framings of 
agency and social inter-relationships, as well as enactivism's implications for cognitive science. These 
ideas are investigated by, among others, Di Paolo (2005, 2009), Thompson (2005, 2007), Barandiaran et 
al (2008, 2009) and Menary (2010).  And yet, despite this significant shift in theoretical emphasis, only a 
fraction of the major artworks analysed here could claim to have adopted embodied or situated 
approaches. One reason for this conceptual inertia may relate to a lack of technical or conceptual insight 
into alternative models. However, there are a number artists who do engage with innovative and 
embodied approaches, often working outside of the mainstream of the art world. There now follows a 
brief evaluation of four artworks that have significantly reconceptualised interaction and its associated 
agencies and contexts. 
 
Case Studies 
 
Sur-Natures, Miguel Chevalier, 2012 
Miguel Chevalier's Sur-Natures was a virtual reality installation exhibited at the Paris Charles de Gaulle 
airport in 2012. The installation was both generative and interactive, involving the growth of a virtual 
garden, comprised initially of eighteen autonomous virtual 'seeds' featuring what the artist describes as 
“multiple colors, luminescent, scalar plants - herbaceous, red and purple cacti and long yellow flowers 
with turquoise stems” (Chevalier, 2014).  In addition, the system involved situated virtual organisms in 
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which “translucent plants grow and change because of motion detectors which register passing 
pedestrians” (Lieser, 2009, p.181). 
 
The typology and MCA conducted for the present chapter places Sur-Natures as an outlier within the data 
set of twenty-five digital artworks representing, along with Stelarc's Parasite, an extreme and, arguably, 
innovative form of interactive artwork. Chevalier's virtual flowers are not an attempt to replicate nature. 
They are strikingly artificial-looking, clearly framed within the materiality of the digital medium; they are 
also “translucent and fragile, and they refer to the underlying digital structure” (Lieser, 2009, p.181).  
 
The virtual flowers that ‘grew’ in the installation reacted to the passage of people within the airport via 
sensor technologies, enabling plants to bend and move according to the visitor's physical orientation, 
creating a kind of plant ballet. Miguel Chevalier compares this work to Monet's time series, but the 
former also constitutes an adaptive system, deploying a combination of random elements as well as 
biologically inspired ‘morphogenetic code’, in which plants evolve according to the specific conditions in 
the airport.  
 
To paraphrase Chevalier, the plants grew non-determinedly, blooming and dying according to the 
evolutionary model of the software; they “grow every day in real time and evolve to infinity” (Chevalier, 
2014). But Chevalier's plants also grew in reaction to the specific environmental and embodied actions of 
people walking through the airport. With its non-determined set of outcomes, Sur-Natures exemplifies 
(whether consciously or not) an intra-enactive framing of specific actions and agencies. It represents an 
isolated minority of mainstream artworks that have integrated new conceptions of the active participant 
within creative digital practice. 
 
 
Burning Down Memory, Eleanor Dare, 2014 
Burning Down Memory by Eleanor Dare (exhibited at the Slade Research Centre, London, May 2014) 
was the documentation of a sensor-based performance in which the author attempted to articulate sub-
symbolic experiences, i.e. experiences and types of knowledge that cannot be expressed in language or 
any other types of symbolic system.  
 
The author was attached to a Galvanic Skin Response sensor (sometimes known as a “lie detector” or 
GSR) as well as an EEG headset (an Electroencephalograph which measures fluctuations in voltage 
emanating from the scalp). When the GSR unit detected a significant drop in resistance, indicative of 
anxiety, the author was given an electric shock, which in turn sent signals through the EEG headset. If the 
EEG signals were beyond a certain threshold of emotional arousal the signals triggered the permanent 
removal of pixels from an image of a wartime bomb site in South London, via a series of virtual “fires” in 
the software. 
 
Figure 1.  The artist Eleanor Dare is electrocuted; this results in the destructive removal of pixels from 
an image of a bomb site in South London 
 
FIGURE 1 
 
 
Burning Down Memory destabilised the idea of an originary event, questioning and inverting the status of 
documentation and the conventional notion that an event precedes and authorises its documentation; an 
order that is often taken for granted, as Auslander (2006) articulates. At the same time, the vulnerability 
of bio-sensor technology (even medical grade EEG sensors) to environmental noise and false readings 
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adds another element of ontological doubt to the technologies of representation at play, arguably blurring 
the boundaries between subjects, objects and the causal flow of documentation. 
 
In Burning Down Memory, the body and the computer system became mediums for an investigation into 
agency and knowledge representation. But, although the EEG headset was positioned around a face, the 
project was not about “the face as an interface” as Blackman expresses it (2008), but about the 
frequencies that emanate from the face and the brain, from hands, epidermis and sweat. In this project, 
bodily fluids are framed as cultural as well as physical agents; the body in this configuration was not “an 
inert mass in the service of a superior mind” (Blackman, 2008, p. 30) but a co-agent in a dynamic system 
of meaning-making.  
 
Microphone, EunJoo Shin and Alex McLean, 2010 
Microphone by McLean and Shin (2010) was exhibited at the Unleashed Devices group show, 
Watermans Gallery, London. The interactive sculpture enabled participants to communicate with each 
other by speaking into two large funnel-shaped  wooden structures. The mouth grimaces that participants 
made, rather than the actual sounds they produced, were captured by a digital camera.  
 
Using computer vision and machine learning techniques, the software written by the artists then produced 
vowel sounds. In this way, the physical gestures of users were emphasised, “bringing focus on the role of 
movement in communication. It evokes a feeling that is literally visceral, of vocal organ encoding 
patterns of movement into sound, and being perceived as movements” (McLean, 2011, p. 41).  
 
Microphone deploys context-aware models of human subjects and, combined with sensor technology, it 
expands the agencies at play in interactive works and represents a model of interaction that is far more in 
keeping with a contemporary framing of agency and embodiment than almost all of the high-profile 
works examined in the typology.  
 
VAINS, Eleanor Dare and Lee Weinberg, 2011 
VAINS is a physical computation system that deploys EEG to sense the electronic brainwave frequencies 
of individuals while they are interacting with online art sites. The system works by analysing 
electroencephalographic signals and matching them to suitable artworks based on a collaborative filtering 
algorithm. On the initial phase of the VAINS project, the developers solicited approximately 200 users to 
establish a database of responses to digital artworks online. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. The VAINS system, an EEG headset identifies brainwaves in individual users and matches them 
to artworks via similarity metrics. The metrics evolve and change as more people use the system (Dare & 
Weinberg, 2011) 
 
 
FIGURE 2 
 
 
 
 
 
22 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. The online collaborative filtering interface for VAINS, used in the initial phase of data 
collection (Dare & Weinberg, 2011) 
 
 
FIGURE 3 
 
The EEG system calibrates itself uniquely to each individual by observing the flow of their brainwave 
activity, then allowing for a period of further observation before forwarding users to artworks that might 
correlate to their alpha, beta and gamma wave patterns and those of previous users. In this way, 
participants experience an autonomic process of interaction with online artworks. The project is overtly 
influenced by an enactive and situated methodology that privileges action over a priori goals; “it seeks an 
emergent, fluid and constantly changing set of navigational pathways” (Dare & Weinberg, 2011, p. 20).  
 
 
The deployment of collaborative filtering within the VAINS platform is presented as both a cultural 
medium and an instrumental agent within the work. The very process of constructing recommendations is 
exposed and interrogated. The work provocatively channels users to sites that are stereotypically 
“interest-matched”, such as pink Web pages for teenage girls and sombre grey pages for middle-aged men. 
The extremity of selections challenges users to resist the naturalisation of such processes. 
 
 
This chapter proposes that the deployment of collaborative filtering and other forms of collective 
intelligence, while subject to much media hype, is also a fertile ground for the investigation of agency in 
digital artworks. This is not to revert to an idealised notion of interactivity or ‘death of the author’ 
discourse (Barthes, 1967), but an opportunity to recognise and critique an increasingly prevalent cultural 
and technological form. The next section will outline aspects of the specific algorithm used by the VAINS 
project for collaborative filtering. 
 
Collaborative filtering 
Collaborative filtering is an increasingly significant technique deployed by Web applications. When a site 
suggests "other products you might like" it is probably using a recommendation algorithm, in which 
recommendations are generated through a process of collaborative filtering, either explicitly or implicitly 
invoked. Implicit collaborative filtering might involve surveillance of user choices and patterns of 
preference, as for example, when making a purchase or clicking on a link. Explicit collaborative filtering 
asks users directly to choose a preference – to rate a film, book or holiday and so on. 
 
Euclidean Distance 
A range of equations can be used to quantify the similarity of preferences or correlation between data sets, 
such as the Pearson correlation coefficient or Euclidean distance. These yield scores of how strongly (or 
not) an individual's preferences are matched or how likely there is to be a correlation between values. In 
the example provided here, the range for such values will be normalised to between 0 and 1. The formula 
provided is known as “Euclidean distance” or the “Euclidean metric” algorithm. In the example of 
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VAINS (see the case study section above), Euclidean distance enabled the automatic evaluation of 
similarities between different individuals and their appreciation for digital artworks online. The Euclidean 
distance between two sets of points is calculated as:  
 
   
 
The Euclidean metric establishes the distance between these two points in space and calculates how 
similar two sets of preferences are. A version of the algorithm is provided here in Processing and in the 
client-side language JavaScript, embedded in html. 
 
Algorithm 1. The Euclidean Metric in Processing 
/*processing example, to be run in the Processing IDE available at:  
http://www.processing.org/                                          */ 
void setup(){ 
 
  println(dist(3.0, 1.0, 3.0, 1.0));/* built in distance method*/ 
  println("inverted:  " +1/(1+dist(3.0, 1.0, 3.0, 1.0))); 
  println("our own method:"); 
  println(euclid_Distance(3.0, 1.0, 3.0, 1.0)); 
//invert and normalise: 
  float a = (euclid_Distance(3.0, 1.0, 3.0, 1.0)); 
/* for readability we multiplicatively invert the result, so low 
scores are high and vice versa: */ 
    println("inverted and normalised: "+ 1/(1+a)); 
 
} 
 
float euclid_Distance(float x1, float y1, float x2, float y2) { 
 
  float dx = x1 - x2; 
  float dy = y1 - y2; 
  float dis = sqrt(dx*dx + dy*dy); 
    return dis; 
} 
//end 
The JavaScript code, below, can be saved as 'anything.html' and opened in a browser locally (by 
double-clicking on the anything.html file) or uploaded to a server: 
 Algorithm 2. The Euclidean Metric in JavaScript 
<!DOCTYPE html> 
<html> 
<body> 
<h1>Euclidean Distance</h1> 
<p>Simple Euclidean distance algorithm in JavaScript.</p> 
<p id="euclid_demo"></p> 
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<script> 
/*imaginary preference scores for two artworks by two gallery visitors, 
out of 5, experiment with other values*/ 
  
Henry1 = 3.0; 
Henry2 = 1.0; 
 
Alice1 = 3.0; 
Alice2 = 1.0; 
 
 
  function euclid_Distance(x1, y1, x2, y2) { 
 
    dx = x1 - x2; 
    dy = y1 – y2; 
    dis = Math.sqrt(dx*dx + dy*dy); 
      return dis; 
} 
 
//write the non-normalised result to the document: 
document.write("Raw distance metric for Henry and Alice: " +        
euclid_Distance(Henry1, Henry2, Alice1, Alice2)); 
  
/* With the calculation above the result will be smaller for people 
who are more similar, but you can 'flip' (multiplicatively invert) the 
result to make it more human-understandable, with a high score for 
similarity and a low score for dis-similarity. It will be 
multiplicatively inverted and normalised to values from 0 to 1. A 
division by zero error is also avoided by adding a 1 to the equation.  
The reciprocal of x is 1/x. All numbers have a reciprocal except zero, 
hence the addition of 1 below) 
*/ 
  var eucTemp = euclid_Distance(Henry1, Henry2, Alice1, Alice2) 
  var euc1 = 1/(1+eucTemp); 
 
/* write the normalised result to the document to two decimal places 
*/ 
 
     document.write("<br>Inverted similarity score for Henry and Alice: 
" +euc1.toFixed(2));  
 
</script> 
</body> 
</html> 
 
The code above generates similarity scores for our online gallery visitors "Alice” and "Henry”. In order to 
progress into making a more complex recommendation engine, the VAINS project used the Pearson 
correlation algorithm, i,e. a lengthier formula than Euclidean distance but one that is more robust in the 
presence of non-normalised data, or data with an extreme set of variations. The use of Pearson correlation 
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for collaborative filtering is very clearly described by Toby Segaran in Programming Collective 
Intelligence (2007).  
 
 
Solutions and Recommendations 
Machine learning algorithms increasingly draw upon the millions of terabytes of data that proliferate year 
on year. This is also known as ‘Big Data’. Vendors such as Amazon and Netflix routinely deploy Big 
Data and machine learning, often to target customers with offers of products that they may be interested 
in. Such data might originate from sensors, video and audio input, networks, log files, transactional 
applications, Web, and social media, often in ‘real time’ and on a very large scale. But, despite the 
prevalence and increasing cultural significance of these techniques, they are rarely explored, or critiqued 
by artists; this is despite the growing ease of access to datasets, analytic technology and distributed 
computing frameworks such as Hadoop.   
 
This chapter proposes that machine learning techniques, in tandem with embodied forms of interaction, 
offer an alternative configuration of agency to that used by the majority of high-profile digital artworks. 
This alternative emphasises adaptive software processes in which systems can learn from subjects and 
situations, resulting in outcomes that are not solely pre-determined. In these systems, agency is multi-
linear; this is not to imply a symmetrical form of agency or idealised notions of user empowerment, such 
as those that emerged in the 1990s (see, for example, Bolter et al (1991)), but something closer to 
Dourish's (2001) notion of nuanced interaction discussed earlier in the chapter. 
 
In this light, and as proposed in the opening section, galleries and curators need to think of the medium in 
terms of context instead of content of the work (Graham and Cook, 2010). The understanding of the 
peripheral (technical) requirements that frame or support the work is equally crucial for assessing a piece 
and subsequently making curatorial judgements. 
 
The core recommendations this chapter proposes for developing innovative interactive digital artworks 
are as follows: 
1. Meaning (or intelligibility) in a situated system cannot reside in an a priori model of the user (or 
their possible interactions), but rather in a relation between more generalised plans and specific 
circumstances. 
 
2. Likewise, subjective representation is problematic; it is more useful to examine dynamic and 
situated differences. 
 
3. Dominant modes of interaction, such as those based solely on propositional logic, statistics and a 
priori representations of cause and effect (exemplified in rule-based systems) are fixed and 
reactive and as such are not ideal for generating new ideas or new artistic forms.  
 
4. Open-ended methods are preferable within a system designed to encourage divergent forms of 
artwork and divergent subjectivities. 
 
5. The artworks in such a system, like the subjects who interact with it, will be multiple, situated and 
multi-linear. 
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6. Enactive systems deploy knowledge generated through embodied processes, not only sight, but 
also smell, touch, taste, sound, social and cultural relations.  
 
From these core findings, an encapsulation of this chapter's theoretical and practical rationale can be 
condensed into the following two statements: 
 
1. Interaction is a contingent process of shared and collaborative, ad hoc understandings within the 
framework of generalised or more abstracted a priori intentions. 
 
2. Difference and specificity are key resources in interactive systems working with subjects – 
human or virtual. 
 
 
 
FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS 
While it is important to acknowledge that Big Data and machine learning, like many other emergent 
technologies, are subject to an exaggerated form of “hype curve” (Veryard, 2005, p. 1), they are still 
significant cultural artefacts and are worthy of investigation by contemporary artists. In conjunction with 
embodied and situated technologies, as well as adaptive programming techniques, the time is ripe for a 
significant paradigm shift in the framing of agencies and interactivity models in digital artworks.  It is 
proposed that in the future innovative digital artworks might fruitfully deploy the following combinations 
of technologies and techniques: 
 
• Machine Learning can support systems that learn from “users” and situations as an alternative to 
a priori configurations.  
 
• Collaborative filtering and Crowdsourcing, of the type currently used by many Citizen Science 
projects, might extend the agencies at play in digital artworks. 
 
• Adaptive systems such as genetic algorithms, artificial immune systems and artificial neural 
networks can also generate emergent, non-determined outcomes. 
 
• Embodied systems that work via a range of sensors can react to actions and environmental data, 
enabling a dynamic range of outputs. 
 
• Situated systems, which are socially as well as physically and bodily located in specific 
environments, expand the field of interaction to a set of relational phenomena in keeping with an 
enactivist framing of action, agency and perception. 
 
None of these techniques or processes are proposed as offering isolated solutions; rather, they are 
presented here as parts of dynamic, multi-linear systems, incorporating an enactive approach to human 
experience that is embodied, situated and emergent,  involving multiple forms of agency. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
The historical background and typology presented in this chapter identified a distinct pattern of high-
profile artworks in which disembodied image-objects (or ‘spectacles’) were deployed. The majority of 
works identified were, on the whole, also found to be operating on deprecated models of human computer 
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interaction, predicated on classically cognitivist divisions between agents and their environments. The 
chapter outlined alternatives to these approaches; in particular it highlighted the concept of enactivism.  
 
As Alva Noë has observed (2004), enactivism has evolved significantly since Varela et al first outlined it. 
It now offers a nuanced and potentially non-polarising alternative to orthodox views of human-computer 
interaction. Noë (2004), like Barad (2007) and Suchman (2007), offers a view of agency in which agents 
are entangled with each other in a process of co-origination. Whatever term is applied to this co-
constitution of agencies, whether it is called interactivity, intra-activity or intra-enactivity, it is one that 
will necessitate the integration of radically new conceptions of action and participation within creative 
digital practice. 
 
Throughout this chapter, innovative research in interactive systems has been highlighted, including artists’ 
tools, applications, and techniques that aggregate to offer a critical engagement with emerging multimedia 
trends. In particular, the chapter has looked at situated computing and embodied systems, in which 
context-aware models of human subjects are combined with sensor technology to expand the agencies at 
play in interactive works. The chapter has connected enactive principals to technologies such as Big Data, 
Crowdsourcing and other techniques from artificial intelligence that develop the conception of interaction 
and participation. 
 
The case studies presented here have elucidated some of the specific technical and design strategies used 
in real world projects. The chapter has critiqued the reduction of mainstream digital art to ‘spectacles’, 
and instead highlighted more nuanced works. These works offer forms of interaction that are in keeping 
with current cognitive and computer scientific understandings of both human and machine agencies. In 
detail, this chapter has advanced the work of Noë (2004), Maturana and Varela (1987), Suchman (2007), 
Barad (2007) and Dourish (2001), who all contribute to providing significantly new models for human 
computer interaction within artistic practice. 
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KEY TERMS AND DEFINITIONS 
 
Agency: Agency influences events and processes and therefore acts within the world. It is 
important in the context of interaction models to dispense with the notion that agency is a ‘thing’ or a 
linear force, or that it is restricted to human agents only. 
 
Crowdsourcing: The collective acquisition, explicit or implicit, of data as well as actions and resources, 
this is often undertaken by “lay” people, for example, in the case of Citizen Science projects for 
classifying galaxy types. The term is also often used to refer to what is really a form of crowd funding. 
 
Enactivism: In contrast to the mind-body split of the Cartesian Cogito as a model for human cognition an 
enactivist approach posits "the enactment of a world and a mind on the basis of a history of the variety of 
actions that a being in the world performs" (Varela, Thompson & Rosch, 1991, p. 9). It is a theory of 
cognition that is inseparable from action and is therefore implicitly embodied. 
 
Interactivity: Interactivity refers to the linear relations between computers and humans. The dominant 
mode of interactivity describes a linear process of inputs and outputs, as opposed to the relational 
causality of intra-activity outlined by Karen Barad (2007).  
 
Inter/Intra: The word “inter” mean “between” or “among” while the word “intra” means “within” The 
terms therefore imply quite different patterns of agency and action. Intra may also imply a degree of 
containment, in which agency does not extend beyond the variables within a particular configuration, in 
keeping with an enactive framing of contingent, situated agencies. 
 
Intra-activity: According to Karen Barad (2007), intra-action, unlike interaction, does not 
presuppose “the prior existence of independent entities of relata” (Barad, 2007, p. 139). 
Barad does not take for granted atomistic or Cartesian separations between subject and object; instead she 
sees specific situations and actions as allowing phenomenological relata to emerge as specific causal 
intra- actions. 
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Machine Learning: involves computational and statistical processes of learning from data, often 
deploying adaptive programs. Machine learning systems are therefore not explicitly determined, for 
example, they may involve self-modifying programs in which rules and procedures will adapt according 
to the data and specific situations. 
 
Situated/Situatedness: In the context of computer programs situated agents are embedded in an 
environment. In Haraway’s terms (1991) situatedness is also an ethical recognition of the partiality and 
locatedness of knowledge, as opposed to an idealised notion of objective universality and placeless, 
disembodied, non-partiality. 
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ENDNOTES 
                                                
i  See Sutton, G. (2004). “Exhibiting New Media Art”, Bishop, C. (2011) .Installation Art, Meijers, 
D.  J. (1996). “The Museum and the ‘Ahistorical’ Exhibition”. 
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ii  Reprinted with significant revisions in 1965, from where we reference. 
iii  See also http://www.medienkunstnetz.de/source-text/35/ [last accessed: 2 July 2014]. The text 
was originally written for the New School of Social Research in New York, in collaboration with Bill 
Bryson. 
iv  For a chronological account of time-based media art see Cubitt, S. (1993). Videography – Video 
Media as Art and Culture, Grosenick, Martin & Uta (eds) (2006). Video Art. 
v  “Journeys: Tate History”, online at: 
http://www2.tate.org.uk/archivejourneys/historyhtml/people_public.htm [last accessed: 2 May 2014]. The 
full title of The Daily Mirror front page: “Whichever way you look at Britain’s latest work of art… 
WHAT A LOAD OF RUBBISH - How the Tate dropped 120 bricks”, 16 February 1976. Archival 
material from the reaction of the audience when viewing Equivalent VIII is included in Alan Yentob’s 
“How to Get On in the Art World”, BBC ONE, 20 November 2007.  
vi  The point is also raised at various times in the published discussions of the BALTIC series, as 
well as in the CRUMB forum 
(http://www.crumbweb.org/searchsite.php?search=discussion%20list&focus=Discussion&searchDisc=&t
s=1224503832) [last accessed: 2 July 2014]. 
vii  At the workshop “Digital Audiovisual Preservation in Communities of Practice” (Presto Centre 
and Institut National de l’Audiovisuel, Paris, 4 December 2013), Pip Laurenson (Head of Collection Care 
Research, Tate) presented the challenges that arose when copying obsolete technologies (such as a Sony 
½ inch tape) onto new formats, in order to preserve the work and enable its future exhibiting. The 
preservation of digital data is a fertile subject of research, even though it expands beyond the scope of the 
present chapter. However, it demonstrates that there is a history behind technology-bound pieces that 
needs be known and acknowledged by curators. 
viii  Again, the term is being used as a solution to accommodate the “varied nomenclature” amassed 
around the idea of new media art, such as “art & technology, art/sci, computer art, electronic media, 
variable media, locative media, immersive art, interactive art, and Things That You Plug In” (Graham & 
Cook, 2010, p. 4). Graham and Cook (2010) note that the CRUMB discussion list frequently focused on 
issues of terminology and categories; some years back (2004) they concluded that these names often 
described, apart from the media used in the artwork, the genre, content, theme, and everything in between. 
